2010年9月27日 星期一

台中北澤壽喜燒~~

台中北澤...真的超棒~~~

每次去都是很餓的去...然後出來的時候, 都吃到超想睡覺的~~~



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久違的北澤壽喜燒~~因為沒事先訂位,今天排了後補,

還好流動率夠快,大概等了30min....010.gif

還是建議要定位不然都會等粉久說~~雖說是吃到飽但是因為客人的流通率高,所以食材都粉新鮮,超推薦"無骨安格斯牛小排"油脂分配剛剛好,

不過我覺得只有第一盤,後續續點的肉片超大但是油脂就沒那麼平均分配,不過還是好吃啦...009.gif

飯飯部分是用越光米,雖然沒在日本當地吃得好吃,但在台灣而言算是不錯的了...

醬汁部分,不會很鹹剛剛好

前菜部分,我選了和風鴨胸沙拉,日式和風醬酸酸清爽,鴨胸也很好吃沒腥味喔

DSC00613.JPGDSC00610.JPG

有四種愗類任選吃到飽,每一種都很新鮮喔! 第一輪點了2盤安格斯牛小排+2盤 紐西蘭低脂牛肉,第二輪點了3盤安格斯牛小排......只能說超級飽啦~~

DSC00614.JPGDSC00615.JPG

鮮嫩牛肉刷個2.3下~~~沾著蛋汁、灑上七味粉,

嗯~~~滑溜滑溜又嫩嫩的肉感,只能說~~讚啦!!

DSC00616.JPGDSC00617.JPG

DSC00619.JPGDSC00624.JPG

還有口愛ㄇㄟ ㄇㄟ 推著時蔬車車到處補貨,推薦腐皮、豆腐、烏龍麵(30sec喔)........ 甜點部分則是點了巧克力脆片霜淇淋 ,冰涼爽口又香濃的霜淇淋上灑上脆脆的巧克力脆片,也是很好吃

DSC00622.JPGDSC00632.JPG

目前吃過竹北店、高雄遠百店,還是覺得台中公益店無論是食材、服務,都很讚.....所以推薦去台中公益店喔~~212.gif

台南大遠百大戶屋定食~~


幫忙衝衝人氣囉~~

說真的...蒸龍飯很大碗...干貝不錯吃~~




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趁著等待看電影的空檔,到大遠百1F的大戶屋吃定食,這次選了....干貝蒸籠飯+豆腐雞肉羹定食
有令人驚喜的感覺...分量剛剛好( ^_^呵呵~~對我而言啦)
/タテのせいろご飯と豆腐とチキンのトロトロ煮せっと
干貝蒸籠飯/ホタテのせいろご飯 160元
豆腐雞肉羹/豆腐とチキンのトロトロ煮 170元
NT 300元
很特別的蒸籠飯...貼心的保溫功能
DSC00606.JPG
大概有3~4顆干貝,原以為會有腥味,發現還蠻新鮮的...飯飯也不錯吃....
DSC00609.JPG
湯的勾芡恰到好處,雞肉吃起來超嫩說,加上滑溜滑溜的蛋花,真是好喝~~
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2010年9月26日 星期日

[巴菲特班] 波克夏年報最精華的一段

網誌: 巴菲特班 洪瑞泰 (Michael On)
文章: 波克夏年報最精華的一段
連結: http://mikeon88.blogspot.com/2009/01/blog-post_8837.html

--
波克夏年報最精華的一段
若沒時間看完年報,就只看這一段就好

2007年報
Businesses – The Great, the Good and the Gruesome
Let's take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on.
And while we're at it, let's also discuss what we wish to avoid.
Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren't available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stockmarket purchases. It's better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone. A truly great business must have an enduring "moat" that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business "castle" that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company's being thelowcost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with "Roman Candles," companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed. Our criterion of "enduring" causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid andcontinuous change 能好很久的標準讓我們排除快速且持續變遷產業的公司. Though capitalism's "creative destruction" is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.
Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having
a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.
But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area's premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership's moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can't name its CEO.

Long-term competitive advantage in a
stable industry is what we seek in a business 在穩定的產業中具有長期的競爭優勢是我們尋找的企業. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There's no rule that you have to invest money where you've earned it. Indeed, it's often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can't for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.
Let's look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See's Candy. The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn't grow. Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years. Indeed, I believe that See's, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry's earnings.
At See's, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972. (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire .) Last year See's sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually. Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See's family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire .
We bought See's for $25 million when its sales were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 million.
The capital then required to conduct the business was $8 million. (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.) Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital. Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations. First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable. Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.
Last year See's sales were $383 million, and pre-tax profits were $82 million. The capital now required to run the business is $40 million. This means we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See's has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to "be fruitful and multiply" is one we take seriously at Berkshire .)
There aren't many See's in Corporate America. Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 million to $82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth. That's because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.
A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment. There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 million pre-tax on $400 million of net tangible assets. But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See's situation.
It's far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements. Ask Microsoft or Google.
One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety. This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of. It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.

Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow. When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 million, and its net investment in fixed assets was $570 million. Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 million. But capital expenditures have totaled $1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced. (A simulator can cost us more than $12 million, and we have 273 of them.) Our fixed assets, after depreciation, now amount to $1.079 billion. Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 million, a gain of $159 million since 1996. That gain gave us a good, but far from See's-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million. Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business. Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations. For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category. We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.
Now let's move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk , he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.
The airline industry's demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain.
In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.
To sum up, think of three types of "savings accounts." The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.


好學生的特質:

↗不變 → 高市占
產品
↘會變 → 多角化

2010年9月20日 星期一

任天堂1/4世紀首揭密 對卡帶吹氣是故障主因


天啊 ...... 我以前小時候 就是這樣子吹~~~~~

騙了我25年....

[巴菲特班] 台積電發展太陽能如果失敗 ?

網誌: 巴菲特班 洪瑞泰 (Michael On)
文章: 台積電發展太陽能如果失敗 ?
連結: http://mikeon88.blogspot.com/2010/09/blog-post_19.html


From: 陳彥青
Sent: Monday, September 20, 2010 11:07 AM

老大 請看這個新聞
http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN3/5852952.shtml
台積電投資太陽能,張忠謀說賭了 !
有沒有同學比較懂電子業
如果台積電賭輸,會不會拖累台積電不再優秀 ?


From: mikeon
Sent: Monday, September 20, 2010 1:09 PM

不要猜台積電投資太陽能會不會成功
算一下投資金額占淨值比率多高便知
未超過5%,就續抱

如果比率太高,而且讓你覺得不舒服,就減碼

如新聞所述,「薄膜太陽能電池動土, 未來投資金額將超過5億美元」
5億美元占台積電淨值4,927億元台幣的 3%(=5x32/4,927)
比率並不大



From: Steve Lu
Sent: Wednesday, September 22, 2010 4:43 PM

台積電近期投資綠能相關金額如下:
買茂迪62億的股份,
LED照明技術研發中心暨量產廠房第1階段55億元,
先進薄膜太陽能技術研發中心暨先期量產廠房今年2億美元
將來總投資金額將逾10億美元。
(62 + 55 + 10x32 ) /4,927 = 9%
以上數字還未加計台積電透過其他管道購買或取得專利的花費。
綠能相關總投資在近期內應該破10%,

除了從投資額來看,還有其他可能要注意的
1. 專利取得一定要優先於任何投資,
李國鼎20年前就看到了,
台積電這方面的花費應該還會增加。

2. 綠能後進者將會面臨許多的專利地雷,
台積電將來可能會提列訟訴費和賠償費

3. 台積電許多高階主管在這次的金融海嘯中失敗了,
加上他們又知道公司太多的機密,
與其革除他們,讓敵人雇用他們來壯大,
不如花錢讓這些高階主管每天庸庸碌碌忙別的,
並提早把他們和本業隔離,來保護公司機密。

4. 金融海嘯後,台積電才能以俗價來買專利

5. 綠能產業是另外加入的營業項目,
將來會以台積電的品牌銷售,
所以台積電不再專注本業了,
將同時經營品牌和綠能事業。


2010年9月13日 星期一

[巴菲特班] GDP理論與指數均線扣抵 ?

網誌: 巴菲特班 洪瑞泰 (Michael On)
文章: GDP理論與指數均線扣抵 ?
連結: http://mikeon88.blogspot.com/2010/09/gdp.html

From: 小機
Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2010 9:41 AM

我最近一直在想GDP理論和其它理論有沒有關係
GDP理論是基期比較的關係 v.s.
均線扣抵理論也是基期比較的關係
GDP理論比較YoY v.s. 看年移動均線

GDP YoY = 營收 YoY = 指數 YoY
用GDP推論指數,不如就指數看指數?

指數還不會跌,
因為年均線扣抵還在去年九月的7600附近,
所以均線還在往上揚
其實到十二月一月,均線扣抵在高點,
假使今年十二月或明年一月,指數沒有上漲過高點
均線就會下彎就是台股的高點,
而台灣的高點比美國早了兩三個月

買點也用同樣的對稱法則,買在年均線不再下滑,
反而走平向上時 (扣抵在低點)


From: mikeon
Sent: Sunday, September 12, 2010 8:44 PM

1. 為何均線還在往上揚,股價就不會跌 ?????

「神功」P.210
圖5:巴:均線理論是錯的,因為股價並非採多數決。
波:啊 ! 什麼意思 ?
圖6:巴:不是大家平均買在一百元,股價就不會跌破一百元。
圖7:巴:所以月線、季線、年線通通都不會有支撐,也不構成壓力。
啊 ! 啊 !

2. 你犯了倒果為因的錯誤
是營收(GDP)不佳導致股價(指數)下跌
不是股價(指數)下跌會讓營收(GDP)下降



[巴菲特班] 可轉換公司債如何計算合理投資價值

網誌: 巴菲特班 洪瑞泰 (Michael On)
文章: 可轉換公司債如何計算合理投資價值
連結: http://mikeon88.blogspot.com/2010/09/blog-post_1045.html

From: cash
Sent: Thursday, September 02, 2010 9:05 PM

今天看到公告,原始股東可参加可轉換公司債,
但是要怎樣算這樣的投資合理不合理呢 ?

想當初巴菲特好像也買過不少的特別股或轉換公司債的特別股等等,
他是怎樣計算這樣的投資工具的價值呢 ?
你能否用這例子算算該不該参加這樣的認購呢 ?
或者股價高於多少時就應該轉換呢 ?
9/2股價收盤為4.1

[2010-08-31](601398)工商銀行A股可轉換公司債券發行方案提示性公告

中國工商銀行股份有限公司現將本次公開發行A股可轉換公司債券(下稱:可轉債)的發行方案提示如下:

本次共發行250億元可轉債,按面值人民幣100元/張發行,共計250,000,000張。
本次發行的可轉債向公司除控股股東中華人民共和國財政部與中央匯金投資有限責任公司以外的原A股股東優先配售,優先配售后余額部分(含除控股股東以外的原A股股東放棄優先配 售部分)采用網下對機構投資者配售和通過上海證券交易所交易系統(下稱:上交所系統)網上定價發行相結合的方式進行,預設的發行數量比例為70%:30%,若有余額則由承銷團包銷。

除控股股東以外的原A股股東可優先配售的可轉債數量為其在股權登記日收市后登記在冊的持有公司A股股份數按每股配售0.51元可轉債的比例,并按1,000元/手轉換成手數,不足1手的部分按照精確算法取整;優先認購通過上交所系統進行,配售代碼為「764398」,配售簡稱為「工行配債」。

本次發行的優先配售日和網上、網下申購日均為2010年8月31日,其中優先配售和網上申購時間均為上交所系統的正常交易時間,即9:30-11:30,13:00-15:00。

除控股股東以外的原A股股東除可參加優先配售外,還可參加優先配售后余額的申購;一般社會公眾投資者通過上交所系統參加網上發行,申購代碼為「783398」,申購簡稱為「工行發債」。每個賬戶申購數量上限為75億元(7,500,000手);每個機構投資者的申購數量上限為175億元(175,000,000張)。


From: mikeon
Sent: Friday, September 03, 2010 7:41 AM

我只知道債券的合理價也是用股息折現公式來算
至於可轉債怎麼算,則不知

知道的同學請多多指教


From: Tsai Tsung Hsien
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2010 8:31 AM

可轉債具有選擇權的特性,
可利用二項式或模擬法的方式進行評價。

對於這方法有點複雜很難用信件加以說明,
建議可以參考一些財務工程的書籍。
記得「財務工程與EXCEL VBA 的應用」、
「財務工程與金融計算MATLAB的應用」
這兩本書籍都有談到。

2010年9月9日 星期四

[巴菲特班] 14年前的台積電,讓我賺了一支iphone

網誌: 巴菲特班 洪瑞泰 (Michael On)
文章: 14年前的台積電,讓我賺了一支iphone
連結: http://mikeon88.blogspot.com/2010/09/14iphone.html


From: aaaaaaaaaaqw
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 2010 8:43 PM

14年前的台積電,讓我賺了一支iphone


話說前幾天在跟同事聊天
同事無意間談到他在14年前用106塊買到台積電,
結果套牢到現在(60.5)的悲慘經驗
那時候跟流行,買了一張台積電,
到現在都沒有去刷過簿子
(其間因結婚搬出去住,所以收到股利通知書,
都被他爸爸丟掉了,他也從來沒看過)
然後以過來人的經驗跟我講這幾年他看過太多人玩股票家破人亡的情形

我跟他說不可能
「你應該是大富翁,你自己都不知道」
並跟他打賭如果他的錢超過之前投資的3倍以上,


叫他要買一支 iphone 給我
他很豪氣的跟我說- 沒問題

由於盈再表只能回溯到2002年
所以我重新找出台積電這幾年的配股配息
還原股價並計算這幾年分到的股息及股利
算完之後~~




























以99年9月6日收盤價
股息:118614元
股票:7.13張
合計目前市值:550,180元

當天晚上把家翻過找出塵封中的簿子
事實證明-他真的是大富翁而我也賺得一支iphone

結論:
1. 即時當時買在當年的最高點(我同事買的價錢106塊),至今還能有五倍的報酬率

2. 如果買到當年的低點50多塊,以同樣的本金,
可以買兩張台積電,這樣會有10倍的的報酬率(10萬變110多萬)

3. 同事刷完簿子後,他說他好像被雷打到,
而我卻感覺被原子彈轟過

4. 原來買股票就跟種樹一樣,經過了幾年,
你會發現它長大了,
突然有一天你會發現你家前面多了一棵神木

5. 他媽的!我為什麼今年才認識 mike

6. mike 是神不是人